The Militia Digest

Qais al-Khazali (AAH — secretary-general) said on September 10 that weapons outside state institutions should come under official security-force management, while saying AAH’s arms were already confined within the PMF. He distinguished state management from surrender and rejected destroying the weapons. Any process, he said, must follow government formation and Coordination Framework approval, the departure of U.S. forces, an end to drone flights and Iraq’s acquisition of air-defence systems. Hamid al-Musawi (Badr — parliamentary bloc spokesman) separately said resistance factions did not need weapons. Ali al-Asadi (HAN— political council head) said Nujaba had agreed to regulate weapons rather than restrict them. Press reports meanwhile placed Kataib Hezbollah and Nujaba on rejecting state custody. AAH and Nujaba have now stated their different formulas directly, while KH’s position remains reported rather than stated by the faction. The September 30 date remains fixed for the coalition mission, not the weapons dialogue.

The U.S. Treasury on September 10 sanctioned nine Iraqi nationals and two Iraq-based companies as part of a wider regional action. Treasury linked four of the Iraqi designees to Kataib Hezbollah and attributed financing, money laundering and assistance with Iranian sanctions evasion to the designated networks. The Iraqi names also included Majid and Abdulhasan Ali Akbar Namdar al-Mandalawi, identified as brothers of politician Mohsen al-Mandalawi. Treasury described the action as part of Operation Economic Outcast, which it says seeks to cut financial channels supporting Iran, the IRGC and allied armed groups. Middle East Eye separately reported that Kataib Hezbollah had rejected an Iraqi government disarmament order, but quoted no faction statement.

Al-Khazali said the weapons-control initiative did not apply to the Peshmerga as an institution, but said the force must answer to Iraq’s commander-in-chief. He said AAH would pursue separating the Kurdistan Region’s political leadership from the Peshmerga. Al-Musawi went further, announcing a legal move to include the Peshmerga in requirements separating armed forces from political parties. He also said Badr would challenge the Kurdistan Region presidency law before the Federal Supreme Court. He said the law permits the Kurdistan Parliament to move the Peshmerga outside the Region without Baghdad’s approval. Al-Musawi alleged that three Kurdistan Regional Government brigades within the Border Guard receive Baghdad salaries. He separately alleged that some Peshmerga personnel receive Baghdad salaries while living in Germany; no Iraqi or Kurdistan Regional Government authority has addressed those claims. AAH and Badr agree on federal command, but Badr has added a court challenge and a party-disengagement move.

Al-Ahad TV (AAH — official) on September 11 reaffirmed Dr. Laith al-Khazali as Sadiqoun’s nominee for deputy prime minister. Jasim Muhammad (AAH — Sadiqoun MP) said there was no veto against the bloc’s nominees and that it would proceed with its claimed entitlement. Qais al-Khazali used narrower wording, saying a U.S. reservation was being discussed behind the scenes and that one figure inside Iraq opposed the choice. Al-Musawi backed a vote on the deputy-premier posts and endorsed Laith al-Khazali and Mohsen al-Mandalawi. Qais al-Khazali claimed Sadiqoun had enough allies inside and outside the Framework to secure its entitlement. MP Jasim Warwar al-Sharifi defined that entitlement as a ministry and a deputy-premier post, not the PMF chairmanship. Al-Khazali likewise denied seeking Faleh al-Fayyad’s post, but said Fayyad’s influence over elections and PMF decisions must end and backed a future manager from inside the PMF but outside the factions. The cabinet claim remains unsettled by a vote, while al-Khazali is separately pressing for a future change in PMF management.