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MILITIA DESK / RESEARCH REPORT

AAH against KH and Nujaba

TV attacks and media strategy

Asaib Ahl al-Haq's media campaign against
Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba

25 September to 7 October 2026

142,284 Telegram messages collected

6,571 YouTube upload records

26 Arabic clip transcripts

October 2026



Asaib Ahl al-Haq's media campaign

25 September–7 October 2026 • TV attacks, official policy advocacy and rival responses

Salam Adil, a commentator affiliated with the Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), makes aggressive named attacks on Kataib Hezbollah (KH) and Harakat al-Nujaba, rival armed groups. AAH-owned Al Ahad TV, its official broadcaster, carries a softer policy argument. Unofficial AAH pages reinforce that policy.

01

Direct attacks on TV

TV stations outside the AAH media network

Salam Adil (@SalamAdel76)

Al Ayyam TV • Dijla TV
Al Nahrain TV

He names KH and Nujaba and their leaders, blames their decisions for risking sanctions and another siege, and attacks their factional interests and flag displays.

The confrontation is personal and explicit. TV footage also circulates online.

Al Ayyam TV • named leaders

02

Official AAH television

Al Ahad TV • AAH-owned

Salam Adil and Haider Barzanji

Haider Barzanji is an AAH-affiliated commentator.

Salam Adil argues for diplomacy, trust in the financial system and building state institutions to avoid sanctions.

Haider Barzanji argues for organising weapons within the state and moving resistance into politics. He presents this as progress, rejecting charges of betrayal or retreat.

The reviewed Al Ahad TV appearances avoid naming KH, Nujaba and their leaders.

Salam Adil on Al Ahad TV
Haider Barzanji on Al Ahad TV

03

Unofficial AAH pages

Three examples from affiliated accounts

Shahd Al Yasiri (@shahadyasiri)
Asaib Ahl al Haq Audience (@t4_1s)
Huruf Sumerian News (@alijahied)

A shared policy quotation • 1 October

They carry Qais al-Khazali, AAH's leader, urging state building and constitutional procedures for weapons outside state control, under schedules set by the government and the Coordination Framework, an alliance of Shia political parties.

These pages reinforce the policy; the reviewed posts do not repost the named-attack clips.

Shahd Al Yasiri • policy quotation
AAH Audience • same quotation
Huruf Sumerian News • same quotation

The responses

KH- and Nujaba-affiliated accounts attack Salam Adil personally, call the confrontation an AAH media campaign and defend their refusal of state weapons control. Replies circulate within and between their networks. Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS), another Iraqi militia, leaves room to resist implementation: an affiliated account attacks Salam Adil, while its official statement ties commitment to others' compliance. The Badr Organisation, an Iraqi armed and political group, is silent on the AAH attacks against KH and Nujaba in the reviewed material.

Unofficial-page review: 12 selected accounts, 10 active; 89 media-only posts were not all transcribed.

Salam Adil's televised attacks

What he said on Al Ayyam TV, Dijla TV and Al Nahrain TV, followed by his subsequent X posts.

Salam Adil (@SalamAdel76), formerly in KH's media network and now in AAH's, attacks KH and Nujaba on TV outside the AAH network. He names their leaders and blames their decisions for risking sanctions and another siege of Iraq.

01

Al Ayyam TV

Branded AYM • 3 October
Hadith al-Iraq
Presenter: Farah Nabil

He says KH and Nujaba refused the 30 September state-control-of-weapons agreement. Gulf states sought U.S. intervention, he says, and a U.S. message prompted an emergency Iraqi meeting. He warns of sanctions, exclusion from SWIFT, the international financial messaging system, and financial isolation.

He names Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi, KH's secretary general, and Akram al-Kaabi, Nujaba's secretary general. Their refusal of state control of weapons and the Coordination Framework agreement, he says, would expose 30 million Shia, plus Sunnis and Kurds, to siege.

He compares their decisions to Iraq's former president Saddam Hussein invading Kuwait and refusing demands to withdraw: leaders make decisions while Iraqis suffer sanctions and collective punishment. He warns that another siege's outcome is unpredictable and demands that the leaders understand the consequences.

[Agreement and sanctions • 01:01–01:45](#) | [Programme summary](#) | [Named leaders • 01:19–01:47](#) | [Saddam comparison • 00:00–01:19](#)

02

Dijla TV

Factional interests
Vehicle display

He accuses KH and Nujaba of misusing armed brigades for factional political interests and endangering the wider institution. He says their position does not represent all factions or the institution's leadership, and backs Qais al-Khazali's proposal to separate military and party politics.

In another clip, he mocks a vehicle belonging to the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) driving over the U.S. flag as a cartoon-like stunt that neither avenges the dead nor defeats America. He urges an end to remaining locked in war.

[Factional interests](#) | [PMF vehicle and moving beyond war](#)

03

Al Nahrain TV

Kaabi's flag display
Sanctions warning

Separately, he names and criticises Akram al-Kaabi over his U.S.-flag display, calling it publicity unworthy of a veteran fighter and blaming shallow advice from his advisers. He also names KH and Nujaba: continuing their approach, he says, risks renewed obstruction of the PMF law, sanctions, financial exclusion and domestic crises. He urges maturity and a smarter diplomatic course.

[Kaabi and both factions • 00:03–00:48](#)

Subsequent X posts • 4–7 October

He tells both leaders they are wrong, neither religious authorities nor the only resistance leaders, and should join the political-resistance path. He attacks Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi's political competence, accuses him of running KH as a personal empire for himself and his sons, and calls for an internal corrective revolt. Claiming authorship of sovereignty messaging for Huqooq, KH's political wing, he attacks the resistance-aligned media outlet Sabereen News, shadow pages and statements by KH security official Abu Mujahid al-Assaf as smears, abuse and betrayal accusations, and declares Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi's time over.

[4 October • direct address to both leaders](#) | [7 October • internal KH revolt and media attack](#)

How KH and Nujaba responded

Personal replies to Salam Adil, accusations against the wider AAH network and the weapons-policy counterargument.

KH- and Nujaba-affiliated accounts treat Salam Adil's attacks as part of an AAH media offensive. Their replies target Salam Adil personally, the wider AAH media network or the weapons policy. The target of each response is shown below.

01

Salam Adil personally

7 October • Nujaba to KH

Hashd al Shaabi News (@mhzen_313)

Assessed affiliation: Harakat al-Nujaba

It accuses Salam Adil of insulting Kaabi and AAH of financing his attacks. It also condemns Khazali.

Jihad al Tabyin 313 (@gfddchhhjbb)

Assessed affiliation: Kataib Hezbollah

It forwards the same reply into KH's network 51 minutes 39 seconds later.

Hashd al Shaabi News • 7 Oct post
Jihad al Tabyin 313 • 7 Oct forward

A direct answer to Salam Adil's flag criticism

On 6 October, Qawarir News Agency (@trendpress), assessed within the wider resistance ecosystem, explicitly answers Salam Adil's description of vehicles driving over the U.S. and Israeli flags as a cartoon-like scene. It ridicules his public credibility, names Salam Adil and identifies the remark being answered.

Qawarir News Agency • 6 Oct post

02

The wider AAH network

4 October • KH-affiliated accounts

Kataibiyun (@k3l3t)

Kataibiya 313 (@kt3l3)

Both assessed affiliated with Kataib Hezbollah

Both publish the same accusation: AAH pages and TV commentators are attacking KH and Nujaba over their refusal to organise weapons before conditions and guarantees are met.

The explicit target is the wider AAH media campaign.

Kataibiyun • 4 Oct post
Kataibiya 313 • 4 Oct post

03

The weapons policy

3–7 October • policy counterarguments

Al Nujaba TV (NTV) (@ntviraq)

Nujaba-affiliated TV channel

Political analyst Hashim al-Kindi challenges Haider Barzanji in a debate over weapons control. KH pages defend conditions and guarantees and reject blaming KH and Nujaba for economic pressure.

These replies do not explicitly name Al Ahad TV as their target.

NTV • 3 Oct debate
Kataibiyun • 7 Oct post

The campaign accusation predates these replies

On 2 October, Resistance Archive in Iraq (@work_r313) and Ansar al Qaim (@ansaralqayim313), both assessed within the wider resistance ecosystem, carry resistance-media commentator Ali Murtadha's accusation that AAH TikTok pages and Salam Adil's TV appearances are attacking KH. KH-affiliated Kataibiya 313 (@kt3l3) repeats it. The accusation links Salam Adil's attacks to AAH's wider network.

Resistance Archive in Iraq • 2 Oct | Ansar al Qaim • 2 Oct | Kataibiya 313 • 2 Oct

How KSS and Badr responded

Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS) and the Badr Organisation: account-level responses to the AAH campaign.

KSS leaves room to resist implementation: its official commitment depends on others' compliance, while an affiliated account attacks Salam Adil. Badr is silent on the AAH attacks against KH and Nujaba in the reviewed material.

01

KSS

Criticism and room to withhold implementation

Sherzad (@sherzad4_313)

Assessed KSS affiliation

30 September–1 October: mocks Salam Adil and accuses him of changing sides. On 1 October, the same account posts Qais al-Khazali's visit to the graves of KH's fallen fighters, then appeals to AAH and KH: "Out of respect for the martyrs, both sides should stop the quarrelling."

[Attack on Salam Adil](#) | [Call for restraint](#)

Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada (@saedalshuhada313)

Official KSS account

1 October: thanks Iraq's prime minister Ali al-Zaydi for preventing intra-Shia fighting, and thanks fighters across factions. It commits if the other side honours the signed terms. It names neither Salam Adil nor Al Ahad TV.

[Official KSS statement](#)

Methodology

25 September–7 October 2026, ending at 12:45 UTC on 7 October: 142,284 unique Telegram messages across 407 roster account collection windows; 6,571 YouTube upload records; 20 X posts; 11 Facebook posts; and 26 Arabic clip transcripts. Collection used Iraq Monitor's research pipeline. Roster assessments identify account affiliations; reviewed clips, post text, direct forwards and matching wording establish the reported behaviour.

02

Badr

No response to the AAH attacks

Al Ghadeer TV (@alghadeertv)

Abu Turab al Tamimi (@abotorbatamime)

Assessed Badr affiliation • examples among 23 reviewed accounts

Across the reviewed text and captions from 23 Badr accounts, no response to Salam Adil's attacks or the wider AAH media campaign against KH and Nujaba was identified.

Badr is silent on this campaign in the reviewed material.